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Outline of a Fair Share Milk Pricing Policy Program 
As Requested by Carolyn Orr, Council of State Governments 
After the February St. Albans, Vermont Meeting on 
Dairy Policy and Prices 
 
by Ronald W. Cotterill, Director 
Food Marketing Policy Center 
University of Connecticut 
 
March 23, 2006 
 
1) The basic proposition of a fair share milk pricing policy program is the following:  
Retail milk prices during the low phase of the raw milk price cycle and possibly 
during the entire raw milk price cycle are high relative to raw milk prices.  The 
large marketing spread is not due to excessive processor margins.  It is due to 
excessive retailer margins.  The fair share pricing program will redress the 
imbalance in prices in the market channel and eliminate part or all of the pricing 
inefficiency that comes from the exercise of market power by retailers.  This 
pricing inefficiency harms consumers; however, it also harms farmers that receive 
a price that is below the long run supply price, and it harms processors because 
they process less milk.  The farm level pricing problems of farmers in the 
Northeast is exacerbated by inter regional distortions in the raw milk price surface 
as explained in University of Connecticut Food Marketing Policy Issue Paper No. 
48 (http://www.fmpc.uconn.edu).  Throughout the raw milk price cycle farmers in 
the upper Midwest and far West are advantaged under current federal milk pricing 
policies and the activities of state’s in their regions.  Hoard’s Dairyman mailbox 
prices show that farmers in the upper Midwest routinely receive higher prices for 
raw milk than farmers in the Northeast.  This is a price inversion because raw 
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milk should be higher valued in areas of the country where fluid utilization is 
higher.  Such areas include the Southeast and the Northeast. 
Finally, and perhaps equally as important as the economic reasons given 
above, there is very strong interest in redressing the rural urban imbalance in 
economic opportunity.  In New York downstate citizens have a concern for the 
preservation of rural upstate New York.  The same is true in urban and rural New 
England.  Farmers, their land, and rural farming based communities in New York 
and New England are a cultural asset worth preserving. 
2) The fair share milk pricing policy will reallocate retailer margins by using the 
following pricing rule:  Retailers will be allowed to mark up milk that they 
receive from wholesalers a certain amount, for example, 20 percent.  Any markup 
over and above this floor amount will be shared with farmers according to a fair 
share rate, for example, 50 percent.  Let us assume the farm price has dropped to 
$1.25 a gallon for a particular fat content milk, for example, whole milk at 3.5 
percent or 3.25 percent butterfat.  Also assume that processors’ cost is 
approximately 75 cents per gallon for wholesale milk delivered to the back room 
cooler of a retailer.  This means the delivered wholesale price of the milk is $2.00 
per gallon.  Under the fair share pricing rule retailers would be allowed to mark it 
up 20 percent, that is to $2.40 at retail without incurring an obligation to pay 
money to farmers.  If they mark the milk up more than that, for example, to $3.00 
a gallon then with a 50 percent share ratio the retailer keeps only 30 cents of the 
additional 60 cents and pays the other 30 cents into a producer fund for return to 
the farmers that supply this milk.  This effectively raises the producer price from 
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$1.25 a gallon to $1.55 a gallon.  Note it does not affect the processor in any 
fashion. 
3) Fair share pricing can be implemented on a state by state basis in the Northeast.  
If the Southern New England states and New York joined to do this the program, 
operated independently in each state, it would effectively cover most of the 
Northeast milk shed.  Adding New Jersey and other New England states would, of 
course, enhance coverage, as would the addition of Pennsylvania.   
Note that there is no free rider problem with this pricing rule and strategy to 
return benefits to farmers.  There is no free rider problem because a retailer 
cannot avoid payment of the fair share amount into the settlement funds by 
switching to some other milk supplier.  It doesn’t matter what supplier supplies 
the milk, the payment is triggered by the retail pricing behavior, not the source of 
the supply.  This basic fact also means that this type of pricing program is not in 
violation of the interstate commerce clause.  It does not discriminate and 
distribute benefits by state boundaries.  It distributes benefits to the entire milk 
shed.   
There is a drawback in the implementation of these programs due to this fact.  
If, for example, the state of Connecticut instituted fair share program and states 
around it did not, retailer payments would go to the processors that supply milk 
into Connecticut which include Garelick Farms in Franklin, Massachusetts as well 
as Hood from Massachusetts plants and New York plants.  Connecticut retailer 
payments would be paid out to farmers that supplied milk to those plants.  Since 
most of the milk into those plants did not go to the state of Connecticut, the 
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amount per farmer would be minimal.  As the fair share program is instituted in 
other states, such as Rhode Island and Massachusetts, then virtually all of the 
volume of milk from a plant such as the Franklin, Massachusetts plant or the 
Hood Charleston plant would be covered, and farmers would get a larger 
undiluted portion of the fair share payment per hundredweight. 
4) The legislation needed at the state level to implement this kind of program could 
be as simple as what the Connecticut legislature passed last year.  That legislation 
authorizes the Milk Regulation Board to make rules and regulations affecting the 
pricing of milk in the state of Connecticut.  Basically state level authorization is 
needed for a Milk Regulation Board to exist and for it to have the power to 
regulate retail margins and prices in the milk channel.  The Board would also 
need the power to audit retail operations and possibly the operations of a regional 
cooperative marketing agency (RCMA) that is established by cooperatives and 
farmer organizations in the Northeast to oversee the repatriation of these funds to 
the farmers that produce the milk.  Since the cooperatives, most notably Dairy 
Marketing Services and AgriMark, supply nearly all of the milk to fluid plants 
they can identify the trail back to individual farmers.   
The state level milk pricing agency would need the power to declare that 
retailers should pay the amount generated by the fair share pricing rule into a 
producer settlement fund.   They also need for a vehicle to repatriate funds to 
farmers.  We would suggest that a regional cooperative marketing agency 
(RCMA) be established along the lines of those that were established nearly 
twenty years ago in the Northeast.  This organization would be created by the 
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agricultural co-ops in the region and other farm associations to oversee and 
manage the repatriation of funds from the retail stage by the various states to the 
farmers that produce the milk.  A state board may need to request the creation of 
such an agency, and it would need to work with it to oversee the operation of the 
producer settlement fund. 
5) The policy has the potential to return substantial income to dairy farmers that 
supply the Northeast fluid market.  Attorney Daniel Smith of Montpelier, 
Vermont has provided a rough estimate.  I would note, however, that he has the 
retailers repatriate virtually all of the money over 20 percent over the 20 percent 
markup.  This 100 percent fair share rate will not work.  The proposal that we are 
advancing from the University of Connecticut would be to establish a fair share 
rule and repatriate only a portion of the amount over 20 percent.  One needs to do 
this otherwise the retailers have no incentive to raise price, and in that case there 
would be no money in the fund.   
One might think that a fair share rule, such as 50 percent might well benefit 
farmers but that retailers would simply raise the price from $3.00 to $3.50 a 
gallon in order to keep the same dollar margins that they had prior to regulation.  
This will not happen because it can be prevented by the design of the regulatory 
fair share pricing rule.  For example, the 50 percent rule means that one is 
doubling the price elasticity of demand that the retailers are actually observing in 
the market.  This is a strong disincentive for further price increases by the 
retailers.  One can also increase the fair share rate progressively to eliminate the 
retailers’ incentive to pass on higher farm prices.  Effectively one can manage the 
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fair share rate to distribute retailer margin to farmers and consumers while 
preserving a certain amount for the retailer. 
6) The greatest benefit or selling point of this proposed policy is its ability to redress 
the perennial income problem that dairy farmers have in the Northeast.  I would 
note that this approach has minimal budgetary impact on a state’s treasury.  This 
is a market based redistribution of income within the milk marketing channel.  I 
would also note that this program fits well with existing federal order and federal 
dairy policy programs.  Moreover, this program would operate successfully even 
if federal milk market orders were disbanded.  Effectively it creates a fluid milk 
pricing policy that is state based and benefits the milk shed for that state.  It is 
closer to the state marketing orders that we had in New England 60 years ago than 
it is to the current federal order system. 
7) The biggest drawback for this proposed program is perhaps the resistance that 
retailers will mount to a regulation that reduces their profits.  I would, however, 
note that retailers may very well have a long term benefit from a program like this 
if it keeps fluid milk production and processing in the region.  Absent some new 
and very strong program to improve the possibility of dairy farming in the 
Northeast one may observe a reduction in fluid milk supply near existing 
processing plants and near existing population centers.  This means that fluid milk 
would have to come from more distant areas in the existing Northeast milk market 
order and quite possibly from outside of the order.  This added transportation cost 
and lengthen supply line would, if anything, detract from the ability of retailers to 
market fluid milk without price elevation. 
